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AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR

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DEFENSE POLICY PANEL

OF THE

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, June 11, 1985.

The Panel met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

Welcome to a special meeting of the Policy Panel of the House Armed Services Committee.

The purpose of our hearing today is to begin an investigation into how nuclear war might occur and what policy actions might be taken to reduce the dangers of a nuclear war from occurring or escalating.

A recently released book, "Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War," provides an interesting framework within which to analyze the actions the decisionmakers may take or avoid in terms of the impact of increasing or decreasing the likelihood of nuclear war.

The editors of the book, Dr. Graham Allison, dean, Dr. Albert Carnesale, academic dean, and Dr. Joseph Nye, professor of government and public policy, all at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, will testify on their approach and their results.

In addition, in order to determine if the framework presented in this book could serve as a common basis for policy discussions, the panel will also hear from other witnesses.

We have invited Dr. Jeremy Stone, director of the Federation of American Scientists; and Gen. Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Adviser.

With this diversity of views on specific issues, we should be able to evoke those areas of the framework, on which mutual agreement exists, and to discuss those areas on which disagreement exist.

Of particular interest will be the witnesses' assessment of how the framework might be useful to the committee process.

Let me suggest that the editors of the book proceed with opening comments concerning their work and laying out for the committee their work and what their conclusions, followed by initial comments from Jeremy Stone and Brent Scowcroft, if they desire; and then questions from the panel.

Let me turn it over to Graham Allison.

STATEMENT OF DR. GRAHAM T. ALLISON, DEAN, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MA

Mr. ALLISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The study whose findings we are reporting today is a multiyear, continuing study at Harvard that has involved about 50 professors, both at Harvard and elsewhere; but we are reporting on the findings of the study that was published yesterday as a book under the title, as you said, "Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War."

Today, we are representing only the views of the three of us, however, and not of any institutions with which we are affiliated.

If one were to start with a quiz this morning—which I do not propose to do—but if one were to do so, with three questions, it might go as follows:

First, today, or in the foreseeable future—say, through the year 2000, or even beyond—could any sane leader choose nuclear war as a solution to his problem, could either the President or any President of the United States, or any Chairman of the Soviet Union, choose nuclear war as the solution to his problem?

We say the answer is no.

Second, if we learned that there was an agreement in Geneva yesterday or tomorrow to cut nuclear arsenals in half, would that make it more attractive or less attractive to a leader to choose nuclear war as a solution to his problem?

Indeed, if you look at most of the agenda of issues that this committee debates, if done or not done, would that change the answer to the first question: Nuclear war as a solution to a problem?

Again, we say the answer is no.

In that, we believe that President Reagan has got it just right when he says: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought."

So, the third question is: Does this mean that a nuclear war will never be fought? Can never be fought?

Answer: No; that is, there are lots of other ways in which a nuclear war might occur other than by the deliberate choice of the President or the Soviet leader; and it is that part of the agenda on which we want to focus attention.

What I will do is speak a little bit to the question: What's the special contribution of the study? My colleague, Al Carnesale, will lay out the framework and apply it to a couple of issues on the committee's current agenda: the strategic defense initiative and battlefield nuclear weapons, and then my other colleague, Professor Nye, will talk about an agenda, or a small agenda of specific actions that we believe could be taken to reduce the risks of nuclear war.

So, the question: What's the special contribution of the study?

CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY

Let me summarize it under three points:

First, the study defines a new agenda, what we call the "Owls" agenda, one where individuals who were destined forever to disagree about issues like star wars or the nuclear freeze, could nonetheless agree on some actions we could take now to reduce the risks of nuclear war.

In this we believe there is some common ground that has not yet been politicized between the left and the right, where government could actually act now.

Second, this study tries to shift the focus of attention from the question of more or fewer nuclear weapons to the issue of the use of nuclear weapons, and actions that could be taken to reduce the likelihood that the weapons are used.

Third and finally, the study provides a new criterion, or resurrects an old criterion, but puts it forward in a vigorous fashion; a criterion for assessing the variety of national security programs and defense initiatives that this committee has to deal with; a criterion that reminds us of the point of all this.

It was a German philosopher who observed that the most common form of human stupidity is forgetting what one is trying to do.

So, we say, OK, in this national security realm, what are we trying to do?

And our one-line answer is: "To defend American interests by avoiding nuclear war."

"To defend American interests by avoiding nuclear war." That is the only test that American policy has to meet, in the sense that if we fail to meet that test, we will not have the opportunity to pursue any other objective.

Let me say just another word about each of these three key points.

Imagine that we were to wake up to the news that a Geneva agreement had been reached to cut nuclear arsenals in half—even though that is a much deeper cut than anybody could actually imagine. But, just imagine that.

There would be a celebration, to be sure. But would the fundamental shape of the problem have been changed? Would not both superpowers retain the capability to destroy each other's society?

So, the focus on more or fewer weapons, while not unimportant, we say is less important than a further agenda of issues like the control of nuclear weapons.

For example, consider battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe, and the circumstances in an alert in which those controls might be relaxed and one might be used.

Or, consider training for the people who exercise the responsibility for choice in our Government about the use of nuclear weapons.

Or, consider nonproliferation, or a number of other items that my colleague Joe Nye will point to.

So, our proposition is that there is an extensive agenda of actions that are not necessarily politicized, that we could do that would reduce risks of nuclear war.

On the question of the criterion, I would say that—we have put it provocatively: "Defend American interests by avoiding nuclear war."

This implies the willingness to accept some risk of nuclear war to defend American interests. So to the question of whether we would rather be "Red or dead," as people like to ask, I think we who deal with American policy rightly reject those two options and choose instead to be "Alive and free, but at some risk."

The real question is: How much risk?

We say, the current posture of the United States is too risky with respect to risk of nuclear war, and that there are actions we could take actually to lower those risks, which we strongly favor.

I call on Professor Carnesale, who will lay out the framework of analysis here, which I think will be of interest to the committee and may be of some use, and try to show how it applies to two cases, SDI and battlefield nuclear weapons.

Then Professor Nye will talk about the specific items on the owls' agenda.

STATEMENT OF DR. ALBERT CARNESALE, ACADEMIC DEAN, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MA

Mr. CARNESALE. Thank you.

The framework that we used in examining the risks of nuclear war was based on three questions. First, how might we find ourselves in a major nuclear war? That is, what are the paths that would lead to a major nuclear war between the superpowers?

Next, what are the factors that influence the likelihood of going down those paths?

And then, of course, finally, what are the actions you might take to reduce those likelihoods?

We have identified five general paths to be considered.

First is the surprise attack, the so-called bolt out of the blue.

Here, a leader decides somehow that he and his nation are better off with a nuclear war than without one; and so, starts one.

The second path is preemption in a crisis. This is quite different. Here, a leader does not have to decide that he is better off with a nuclear war than without one. Rather, he believes that nuclear war is likely and the question is: Am I better off with a nuclear war in which I go first rather than in which the adversary goes first? This is a very different decision, and even a national leader could decide to go first.

The third path arises from an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Initially, it might be a limited use, but it could escalate to a major nuclear war.

Fourth is escalation from conventional conflict. For example, in Europe, but it need not only be in Europe. In this case, a conventional war is taking place; one side or the other is losing; and it chooses to escalate to nuclear weapons.

And, fifth, is catalytic nuclear war. This third-party initiation serves to remind us that there are other nations in the world that have nuclear weapons and that we might find ourselves being dragged into a conflict that was not initiated by us but that became a superpower nuclear war anyway.

We do not consider all of these paths to be equally likely; nor are they independent. For example, the surprise attack, the complete "bolt out of the blue," is probably the least likely of the paths.

On the other hand, some combination of escalation and accidental or unauthorized use is probably among the "most likely," if not "the most likely" of the paths.

Those of us who feel strongly about this owlish agenda believe that the greatest danger of nuclear war is when things get out of control rather than when somebody decides intentionally at the outset to get into a major nuclear war. We focus largely on those paths, or combinations of paths, that involve some inadvertent use of nuclear weapons.

Now, to give an example or two. Let's take first battlefield nuclear weapons and examine how you might think about them by going through these paths. Obviously, this will be brief and therefore, somewhat simplistic.

Consider for example, nuclear artillery close to the inter-German border. With regard to the chances of surprise attack or preemption in a crisis, such weapons probably have relatively little effect. In general, those scenarios involve exchanges of the strategic forces.

What about accidental or unauthorized use?

Well, here the battlefield weapons probably play a substantial role. In large measure, these are "use 'em or lose 'em" weapons, because they are close to the border. Therefore, if they are to be useful, it probably requires early release authority on the part of the President, which means there is increased danger of accidental or unauthorized use. Moreover, this release authority may be difficult to retrieve, and so termination of conflict—should there be agreement at the highest political level to do so—might be rather difficult to carry off.

THE THREAT OF ESCALATION

What about escalation? What is the effect of the short-range nuclear forces near the inter-German border?

Here there is a clear tradeoff. The existence of these weapons near the border and the danger of their use—even in an accidental or unauthorized way—must give the Soviets additional pause about starting any kind of a conflict in Europe. So, these weapons probably reduce the likelihood of Soviet aggression to some extent. But, on the other hand—and here's the tradeoff part: If there is such aggression, the danger of that conventional conflict escalating to nuclear conflict is increased.

Finally, in the catalytic, or third-party use, battlefield weapons probable play a relatively minor role, though the danger of terrorists stealing these weapons has been much discussed recently.

Obviously, any judgment of the network of battlefield weapons is a subjective judgment. Those of us who believe that the danger of inadvertent use is more significant than the contribution that these weapons make to deterrence of conventional aggression are in favor of reducing reliance on short-range theater nuclear forces, and to the extent that is possible to remove them from the close proximity to the inter-German border.

Let me take an example that is a little bit further out—the strategic defense initiative. To even discuss this question, or to apply our framework to it, you have to have some notion of what it is that you are talking about. But, as we know, the strategic defense initiative, seems to be all things to all men.

Imagine for the moment that both sides have widespread ballistic missile defenses, but imperfect ones. My remarks focus on the likelihood of nuclear war rather than on the consequences, because if these defenses are substantially less than perfect, our cities remain vulnerable.

What about surprise attack? It is doubtful with these imperfect defenses that either side would decide that a nuclear war would be attractive, because their society could be destroyed.

So, surprise attack probably remains unlikely if it is at all deterred by assured destruction of the cities.

Preemption in crisis? This one is far more complicated. Often, it is oversimplified. Most of the discussions we hear of the strategic defense initiative as it applies to preemption in crisis considers the effect of defenses on the United States side only, and not on the Soviet side.

Clearly, if we have defenses, it would increase the survivability of our forces. There is no doubt about it. That would make the Soviets pause all the more before they preempt.

However, if there were comparable defenses on the Soviet side, then those defenses would undermine the penetrability of those of our forces that survive the Soviet first strike. Most of the defensive technologies that we know of today—certainly, the kinds of defensive systems that are buildable today—would be more effective against the retaliatory attack than they would be against the first strike.

This is not an indisputable law of nature, but it is the current scene. Widespread imperfect defenses on both sides would probably make preemption in crisis somewhat more attractive rather than less so.

Next, accidental or unauthorized use. It is certainly technically plausible to build a defense against a small number of attacking ballistic missiles, whether they be launched by accident or unauthorized. But the notion of spending $70 billion on research, plus the cost of deployment, to guard against that, I think, is an unlikely prospect for the future, especially if its only purpose is to guard against an accidental launch of a ballistic missile, not a bomber, not a cruise missile, not some other way of getting the weapon into the United States.

ESCALATION

That analysis is similar to the preemption in crisis one if we are talking about national defenses of homelands.

And finally, catalytic use by a third party. Again one could defend against third-party use providing that the third party was kind enough to deliver the weapon by a long range ballistic missile. We often hear Qadhafi raised in this context. Qadhafi does not have a nuclear weapon, but if he gets one it is likely to occur long before he has ICBM's. And he is far more likely to deliver it in the

trunk of a Toyota or to smuggle it in in a bail of marijuana—which we cannot keep out of cities—than he is to deliver it by the one system against which we have a defense.

EFFECT OF SDI

So what is the net effect of the SDI in the near term? Realize I am talking about defenses using the kinds of technologies we know about now. We conclude that defenses on both sides, if imperfect, and roughly comparable in capability, would increase the likelihood of nuclear war without significantly changing the consequences. For the near term, at least a decade or two, the ABM Treaty constraints on deployment remain very much in the U.S. interest, and we should stick with it.

Thank you.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MA

Mr. NYE. Mr. Chairman, I am going to speak to the owls' agenda. I should say that our final chapter of this report has 51 recommendations, some of which are hawkish, some of which are dovish. But I want to focus on the owls' agenda because it is the part that has been unattended to or underattended to.

Before I do that I should very quickly say what we mean by these three caricatures.

The hawk tends to believe that you get peace through strength. Essentially you build up weapons because war comes when there is a danger that an aggressor will think that you are weak. And the hawks' dominant historical metaphor is 1939. The hawk has a valid point.

The dove also has a valid historical metaphor which is 1941. As the United States tried to press the Japanese we essentially over pressed them and thereby precipitated the attack on Pearl Harbor. The dove says that overbuilding can put a sense of alarm in the mind of your opponent which leads them to take a desperate action rather than to wait for things to follow their normal course when the normal course looks so awful.

The owl, however, focuses on a third historical metaphor, basically 1914, and the prospect of things getting out of control. And frankly, when we look at the prospects of how a nuclear war might start we think it is much more likely through things getting out of control than through a rational decision.

By things getting out of control we mean the increase in psychological stress which constrains rationality in a deep crisis. We mean the breakdown of standard organizational procedures which might occur in such a period. We mean the dangers of misperceptions and miscommunications which historical studies have shown are typical of deep crises. And we mean, of course, accidents, but accidents which occur not on a clear blue day when there is time to take measures against them, but accidents which occur in the setting of a deep crisis when there is no chance to repair them.

And that leads us to the following 10 commandments of the owls which I will put in the form of do's and don'ts.

The first is to improve safety devices and procedures. And among the steps we recommend is to put permissive action links or electronic combination locks on naval weapons. Now, there are certain dangers to this. The fact that it is not done now is for good reason, which is if you do this it leaves open the prospect of a decapitating strike. But on the other hand, we believe there are ways to phrase this in declaratory policy and reduce or change these procedures during certain conditions to protect against those dangers while at the same time reducing the dangers of accidental, unauthorized launch.

Another device under improving safety procedures is to forgo the temptation to use nuclear alerts as political signals. This is something we did in 1973. It shows toughness in a time of crisis. But when you go into a political alert essentially what you are doing is relaxing all those safety catches which make accidents so unlikely under normal circumstances.

So those are a couple of examples on improving safety devices and procedures.

Under a "don't" for reducing the impact of accidents we say don't rely on short-run nuclear weapons. Professor Carnesale has already explained the rationale as to why we think the nuclear artillery in Europe are too risky a system to be maintained as they are now. We can go into further detail on that in questions if you so wish.

The second area of do's and don'ts relate to planning to stop any war that starts. This is something of a taboo subject. To the left the idea of planning to stop a war smacks of tolerance of nuclear war. To the right it smacks of surrender.

But one of the first things we would want to do if a nuclear war ever began is to be sure we are able to stop it. And yet if you look at the survivability of the communications that we have with the Soviet Union it is not clear that we would be able to stop it. The hotline is not survivable. We need more redundancy in the communication links with the Soviet Union for periods of crises.

We also recommend that these hotlines be spread among all five countries that have nuclear weapons.

A "don't" under planning for stopping a war is "don't relax civilian control." Some of the procedures that we have now for the use of short range nuclear systems require quite extensive delegation. Yet, if you are trying to stop a nuclear war that has started it may be extremely difficult to retrieve that which has been delegated. Professor Carnesale has already discussed this.

A third area of concern is ways to prevent and manage crises. There we say "improve training for crisis decisionmakers." Now, you might say "isn't that obvious? Isn't that a mundane recommendation?" No. If you look at the procedures we have now, we believe they are inadequate. Top decision makers, including the President, Secretaries of State and Defense and Assistant Secretaries often come from backgrounds which do not provide them with any intimate knowledge of nuclear operational procedures.

What they get in the early days of their incumbency is what has been described to us as a forced feeding from a firehose for about a

day and then it is back to business as usual. If something occurs in which they have to think about alerting forces, they often don't fully understand the operational implications of steps they might take.

An example of this was the question of whether to alert the forces at the time of the attempted assassination on President Reagan in 1981.

We would recommend much more attention be paid to the transitions from one administration to another on nuclear decision making and much better procedures of gaming and other types of exercises which could train top decisionmakers to what the operational content of nuclear weapons really is.

Under that same category we say "don't engage forces," but on the contrary try to engage the Soviets in talks about codes of behavior and the relative importance of stakes in Third World crises.

Incidentally, in informal sessions with Soviet counterparts we have begun to talk about some of these measures. We find that in fact there is a good deal that could be accomplished in these sort of crisis prevention talks even if they don't lead to nuclear reductions per se.

Another area that we have emphasized is steps to limit misperceptions. And there our argument is that in a time of crisis the dangers of misperceptions are legion and these can be somewhat removed if you have a pattern of regular meetings with the Soviet leadership. Not only has there not been a summit conference between this country and the Soviet Union a some period of 6 years I guess now since 1979, but we also believe that not mere summits but in fact military talks, regular military talks between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his counterpart would greatly help to remove a degree of the uncertainty and the lack of clarity that goes into current communications between our countries.

Another way to limit misperceptions is not to treat nuclear weapons as normal weapons. You might say that that also seems obvious until you look at our existing plans and procedures and you find that training manuals, storage sites, and other things which are standard operating procedures do integrate nuclear weapons as though they were normal usable battlefield nuclear weapons. Some of the unfortunate rhetoric which surrounded this approach in the early part of the 1980's has been changed but the procedures have not been changed.

And as I understand the plaque right in front of me which describes the mandate of this committee, says "make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval forces." I would submit that many of these questions of rules and regulations for the use of nuclear weapons may be far more relevant to reducing the risks of nuclear war than some of the deep cuts or buildups that are often talked about in formal sessions.

Finally, we have the two measures which relate to increasing stability at a time of crisis. And there we say we should protect much more adequately against decapitation, the idea of a strike against Washington which could decouple our forces from the leadership. Now, usually that is treated as a technological problem. The administration does have useful measures for improving the

technology of command, control and communication. But there is a political dimension to that which we believe needs more attention.

For example, if there were a crisis where would the Vice President be? According to current procedures he would be next to the President, indeed as chairman of the crisis management team. The last place you want the Vice President in a time of deep crisis to be is in Washington. Indeed, even when there is not a deep crisis some lesser constitutionally delegated officer should be out of Washington so that the prospects of decapitation are not such that any opponent, whether it be the Soviets or a terrorist organization, could take seriously.

We also say under increasing crisis stability that we should be negotiating operational arms control with the Soviets not just structural arms control. By structural arms control we refer to the current Geneva talks which deal with the issues of deep cuts and changes in the structure of the forces. But there are a series of other measures far less dramatic about how nuclear forces operate which deserve equal attention. Issues of how we handle antisatellite weapons, issues of how we station submarines, questions about notification of multiple launches of ICBM's, and other matters of this sort may turn out not to be as dramatic but to be as important as structural arms control.

Now, let me mention one thing after we look at those 10 commandments together. Six of those ten things are things that we can do independently, and that require no negotiations with the Soviet Union. That is rather interesting. It means there is a set of measures, measures which we could take here at home, measures which I believe, as Professor Allison said, have not yet been politicized between hawks and doves which could be taken now to reduce the risks of nuclear war.

It does not mean that other measures are not important, either the four other measures I mentioned this morning, or indeed, the hawkish and dovish measures that are on our agenda. But it does mean that there is an unattended or underattended to dimension of the agenda for reducing risks of nuclear war which is in nobody's in-box. Sensible things to do where we might find a middle ground but in which there are no action forcing events.

And what we hope is that a committee as seriously structured and tasked as this one might begin the job of looking at these things which are in nobody's in-box in the administration.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Before we go to questions let me ask if Jeremy and Brent Scowcroft would like to say some things? Jeremy?

Mr. STONE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have some prepared remarks which if there is a transcript I would have printed at the end of my summary.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

STATEMENT OF JEREMY J. STONE, DIRECTOR, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS

Mr. STONE. Let me say first that I have known the three authors for 20 years and I am trained at much the same time and in much

the same school of strategic analysis as they are. And so this may be part of the reason that I do agree with the 10 principles that they stated and have agreed with them for 20 years. And the 52 subsidiary conclusions that they reach I do agree with 90 percent of them and have agreed with those 90 percent of those 50 conclusions for 20 years.

I don't believe the conclusions are in and of themselves new, but I do believe it is a good idea to give them more attention and to review them. Of course, the applications of these principles can be new. I don't believe, however, that this represents a owlish rather than a dovish agenda. And I do think it is important to point out that there is a fundamental difference, I think, between my view of what a dove is and what Joe Nye's, Professor Nye's view is.

And I think this is important for you to understand as politicians because it will show, happily, that doves will support 90 percent of this agenda without any question. The only thing they won't recognize is their description of themselves.

As I understand the debate in American political life since World War II, the great gap has been between those who said the major problem is the Russians and the major solution is deterrence, and those who said, no, the Russians are quite well deterred now but the arms race itself is an autonomous source of danger and our highest priority must be to limit that contest. This I think has been the great divide.

And in that divide it has been the doves that pointed to the war of 1914. They did not point to 1941. And they did not say we need more conciliation of the Russians as this book states. Instead they said inadvertent war, unauthorized war, catalytic war, war by escalation, unintended war, war by new weapons, shorter lead times. These have been the cries from the heart of doves for 40 years.

And as a consequence, what is viewed here as an owlish agenda is I think the agenda of doves with blinders. Now, I don't know whether the authors welcome support phrased that way or reject it. But it seems to me that the doves will support it because they have always felt that war can happen in many other ways and that measures should be taken to do something about it.

Now, as to whether one should shift the attention, as Prof. Graham Allison said, of the community away from the agreements that we have been pursing for 40 years, this is another matter. I do agree that this owlish agenda requires higher priority. But I think that the self-styled owls here are insufficiently sophisticated about the significance of arms control treaties.

And I want to give some examples of that and, Mr. Chairman, put forward an example that shows how all this can be tied together.

POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF AGREEMENTS

The reason these agreements are more important politically than this book suggests was shown yesterday when the President by agreeing to dismantle a single submarine sent tremors throughout the world, pro and con, and in this case I think pro, his action. It was not an enormous decision in terms of numbers of weapons. But it had tremendous political implication. It could lead to a summit

or not having a summit. In the same way the atmospheric test ban treaty prevented a lot of concern about testing in the atmosphere and at the time that it was reached, since the time it was reached, and it represented for President Kennedy a great milestone in his administration and a great political step forward in the relations between the super powers. So was it also with the ABM Treaty and even the maintaining of the SALT II agreement had enormous political implications.

In this regard, when Professor Allison says even if we cut the force levels by 50 percent, it would not make that much difference, one can dispute that in the political realm especially; it would make enormous difference in the political realm.

And I want to use that example to put forward for the committee one concrete example of the constructive, political, military use of an arms control agreement to settle the star wars matter and also to settle the problem of SALT II and of reductions. And by this I mean to show, not only a proposal in which I put some faith, as some of you may know, but also an example of the fact that the level of sophistication in dealing with this subject has to rise above the mere counting of the weapons in dealing with these arms control agreements and understanding their political value as well as their military value.

Now, the proposal I want to put before you as an example is a very simple one, and very timely in light of what the President did yesterday. The proposal is simply this: Let us imagine that the two sides took the SALT II limits, that is, 2,250, 1,320, 1,200, 820 and the limit on heavy missiles, 308, all those building blocks of SALT II, and the two sides then agreed on only one number. It would be the world's simplest negotiation. And the number would be like 5 percent, or 7 percent, and the agreement would be that after that in every successive year indefinitely, they would reduce those limits and sublimits by that fixed percentage year after year until someone cried "Uncle" and was unwilling to continue.

Because of the way the percentages would work, the limits would not go to zero, but they would go ascentotically to zero; they would go steadily downward.

The real significance of this agreement from the Russian point of view would not be just the reductions alone. The real significance from the Russian point of view is that this agreement would deal with star wars, because once this agreement were reached, either side would be very reluctant to break out of the ABM Treaty less this very desirable and continuing reduction process fall apart.

So, for the Russians an ongoing disarmament agreement of indefinite extension would hold star wars hostage. And for the President, it turns out mathematically that this reduction scheme which I have proposed will capture most of his Eureka proposal. At 50-percent reduction achieved in the way I have described would force the Russians to two of the three premises of President Reagan's disarmament proposal in 1982, which we can discuss if the committee wishes subsequently.

In addition, this proposal was made in part by President Carter in Vienna and, as a consequence, the Russians know it cannot be said to be not invented here. The Russians are well aware that no

agreements will be reached here unless they have been proposed in America.

So, these advantages to this agreement and many others, but the point I wanted to make is that a 7-percent reduction in 10 years would produce a 50-percent cut of the weapons covered by the SALT II agreement.

Professor Allison said, in effect, that a 50-percent cut would not make that much difference. And I understand the sense in which he said it, and I agree in the sense in which he said it. But the point we are missing is that a 7-percent reduction for 10 years would deal with the star wars problem. Let the President continue his research, help the Russians have some confidence that deployment would not break out which startled the world and keep disarmament going for 10 years, keep the relations between the super powers in a certain context of ongoing reductions which I think all of you as politicians understand highly desirable politically.

Well, the point I want to conclude on, Mr. Chairman, is that the ideas of the disarmament field change very slowly, and that is why these principles and subsidiary principles have been around for 20 years. The problem is not the wisdom required to enunciate them. The problem after 40 years is the requirement of some one person in our entrepeneurial society, or some small group of people to adopt one of these proposals and to make a Federal case out of it.

I put it to you that there is an enormous difference between listing an agenda for social legislation and getting a piece of legislation through Congress. And the only complaint I have about this marvelous agenda is that we need some people to adopt the agenda items. And I would like the three coauthors of this book to adopt at least one of these agenda items and spent a couple of years on it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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June 11, 1985

Hearing on "Avoiding Nuclear War"
Before the Panel on Defense of the
Armed Services Committee
of the House of Representatives

Testimony of Jeremy J. Stone
Director, Federation of American Scientists

The three authors of the volume "Hawks,Doves and Owls", whom I have known for two decades, are brilliant men, worthy of their Harvard professorships and trained in much the same school of strategic analysis as was I and at much the same time.

Accordingly, it will be no surprise that I agree with the ten principles in their Agenda for Action—and have agreed with those principles for twenty years. Moreover, I agree—and have agreed for twenty years—with 90% of the subsidiary conclusions they reach in that concluding chapter.

Theirs is a sophisticated conventional wisdom; I differ from them only where they seem not to be sophisticated enough.

Thus the emphasis on modernizing the strategic triad could have been written in 1965; I believe that Soviet strategic attack is about as deterred as it can be, and more deterred than it need be. If significant more deterrence were required, it would not be found in modernization of the forces per se but in protecting command and control or reviewing doctrine. Similarly, the faith placed in this volume in Midgetman (to be invulnerable and to be useful politically or militarily) seems to me to be excessive. Worst case analysis will easily explain how Midgetman can be attacked even as this analysis's insatiable appetite for reassurance swallows improvements in range of submarines, MIRVing of our force, the Triad itself, and the 100 fold overkill of our standing force relative to the 100 Soviet cities (i.e. our 10,000 strategic warheads).

When the authors call for putting alliance politics first, I wholly agree, but when they conclude that this means pressing on with cruise and Pershing weapons, I part company. Nothing has been more disruptive of this alliance than that

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deployment.

The author's approach to arms control is that of "managing the arms race" as opposed to efforts to "end it" and of emphasizing "deterrence" over the autonomous dangers of an unchecked arms race. Thus they tick off the freeze as "not a good prescription for avoiding nuclear war" because it complicates, they believe, the permanent search for "maintaining deterrence".

A freeze could be a good prescription, though, if one thinks that there is plenty of deterrence already and that the residual danger to the world is that an unchecked arms race will keep turning up new dangers. This is precisely the view of the American dove.

In this connection, my most serious criticism of this book is its outrageous misstatement of the position of doves as ones favoring "conciliation". I have no idea how this slipped through because the editors must know better. Perhaps they see so little merit in the idea that they refuse to believe that others see the arms race itself as the primary autonomous source of danger. Thus by default, they may conclude that safety lies in just constantly upgrading the deterrent and working on technical fixes and the other items on their agenda. But doves are best defined, I beleive, as those who see the arms race, rather than the Russians, as the main focus of their efforts to defend the nations against nuclear war.

More generally, it is a proven fact that arms control agreements cannot win a Senate ratification without a high degree of public support--both the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty and the ABM Treaty passed the Senate on the wave of a public uprising and no treaties have passed without such uprising. Accordingly, the authors are quite wrong to warn against "overselling" arms control if they want arms control; on the contrary, they should be warning against expecting ratification of agreements that are cosmetic in kind, e.g. the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Peaceful Uses Treaty or SALT II--none of which was America willing to ratify.

The recommendations are not nearly strong enough on the issue of Star Wars or detailed enough.

This is a major major problem and the conclusion that says: Don't "assume" that cities can be defended does not even contradict the President who has not assummed this--only urged that people try. Here the authors just largely ducked the big one.

Now I agree with just about everything else I have not mentioned. And I think the articles written by the non-editors are well researched and well written.

Congressmen will recognize, however, that there is an enormous difference between proclaiming and itemizing a social agenda on the one hand, and getting any particular piece of social legislation through Congress on the other.

By analogy, the agenda gives less guidance about what to do than meets the eye. Except for items like "modernization" or "midgetman" which have, obviously, an enormous constituency of interests, the other items change little over the years precisely because they have no backers and, accordingly, little gets done.

For example,the simple agenda item of getting U.S. political figures to visit Moscow and their political figures to come here has occupied two years of dedicated work by our Federation and, despite some remarkable progress, the ratios of political figures who have and who have not visited the other side stay remarkably constant.

A Vice President of a large bank once cautioned me that the naive inventor believed that all he required to make his fortune was a "good idea". in fact, my friend observed one needs two other ingredients: marketing and financing.

Thus, with the exceptions noted of modernization and Midgetman, each of these items requires at least a handful of "beavers" if these self-styled owls are to be vindicated in their wisdom. In my opinion, the time has come for academic theorists to show much greater recognition of these political realities in their work. As things stand, this volume makes it all seem too easy and the brilliance of the authors is not really being tested.

SHRINKING SALT II AS A SOLUTION TO STAR WARS

In my time, I would like to put forward one

detailed proposal for resolving the conflict at Geneva between Star Wars and getting on with reductions.

Proposal: The two sides would agree to shrink the SALT II limits and sublimits (currently 2250, 1320, 1200, 820 and 308) by a fixed percentage each year (e.g. 7% a year or 5% a year, etc.) for the indefinite future.

This simple proposal has the following desirable characteristics.

*It holds Star Wars deployment hostage. The on-going reductions, extendable indefinitely, would capture the world's imagination and commitment and discourage deployment of ABM defenses by either side lest the other side use such deployment as a justification for ending the reductions. Thus, for the Soviet Union especially, percentage annual reductions (PAR) of SALT II limits provides a political solution to the possibility of future Star Wars deployment.

*For the President, shrinking SALT II provides a method of getting on with the reductions he seeks while continuing with Star Wars research. He can claim a victory in having started reductions--a victory he might even attribute, wrongly or rightly, to Star Wars research--while leaving open the possibility of future deployment of Star Wars which is not formally precluded by the shrink SALT II agreement.

*For the negotiators, the agreement is simplicity itself since it only requires agreement on a single number--the percentage--and uses, otherwise, limits which have been well verified and respected, thus far.

*For the military, on both sides, there is freedom to mix within the SALt II limits and hence all the flexibility they both built into the SALT II limits, while getting the predictability of the other's sides actions they often want.

Because the limits are reduced by the fixed percentage applied to the new limits each year, the levels do not descend linearly to zero (e.g. as in 20 years with 5% a year) but, instead, go to zero only

asymptotically, which is to say they decline steadily but never reach zero. (Thus at 7% a year, the SALT II limits would be cut in half in 10 years; at 5% a year, this would take 14 years)

*President Reagan would be able to observe that a 50% reduction in SALT II limits (e.g. 7% a year for 10 years) would produce most of the Eureka proposal he made in 1982. In particular, it would force Soviet ballistic missile warheads to the 5,000 he wished (see testimony I proved to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 13, 1982) and cut Soviet ballistic missile launchers to close to the 850 he desired. (It would produce only about 2/3rds of the third and final condition of 2500 Soviet ballistic missile warheads on land but this was never considered a serious proposal, requiring as it does, a major restructuring of Soviet forces.)

*For the Soviet side, it provides a reduction proposal that was "made in America"; it is obvious to most observers as it is to Soviet experts that America is, traditionally, unwilling to accept proposals that are not made in America. This proposal was, in fact, made to the Soviet Union by President Carter in June, 1979--albeit only for five years (at 5% a year). The extension to a proposal of indefinite duration, made to cope with the long gestation period of Star Wars, would still leave the above proposal one that was invented here. (Moreover, before President Carter proposed it, the Pentagon studied it for six months and had a number of reasons for liking it including the fact that the Soviet force levels were neared the SALt II limits than were the America forces, something still true today.)

*The Soviet Union could observe, also, that its own proposals are somewhat of this form. The Soviet proposal to shrink the overall limits of SALT II by 25% include, although most observers are not aware of this, shrinkage of the 1320 and 820 limits also. The Soviet proposal would shrink about 5% a year for the first two years:

2250 to 2,000 (11%)
1320 to 1250 (9%)
820 to 750: (9%)

and then, by the end of 1990, three years later, produce these reductions (which amount to 3% a year

for two levels and about 1% a year for the third):

2,000 to 1800(10%)
1,250 to 1,200(4%)
750 to 680(9%)

*Because the Treaty is of indefinite duration, it tends to respond to the obvious difficulty each side is having in getting new treaties and the consequent desirability of putting reductions on a permanent road.

*From the Soviet point of view, also, many of the things which it would plan for to protect against the possibility of Star Wars breakout are not , in fact, covered by SALT II, e.g. long range cruise missiles, anti-satellite activities and entirely new kinds of weapons. As a consequence, shrinkage plus preparedness is a sensible program for Soviet planners.

Clearly, this proposal could be conjoined with other supplementary agreements such as ASAT limits, tightening of ABM Treaty provisions, and so on. But certainly the U.S. could, in future years, abrogate the ABM Treaty anyway whatever is said now and, accordingly, the only real protection which the Soviet Union has over Star Wars may be to begin upon the disarmament road in some long-range agreement as the above provides.

As Chairman Aspin knows, I have briefed high officials on both sides on this proposal and, to my mind, it has stood up well to their initial scrutiny. Indeed, there may be no other proposal that is as simple, as easy to negotiate, and which responds, at least in principle, to the concerns of both sides.

The Washington Post

OUTLOOK

A Bear Hug to Avoid Star Wars?

Moscow Could Offer Steady Reductions of Offensive Nuclear Arms

By Jeremy J. Stone

THE REAGAN administration says it wants, during the next 10 years, a "radical reduction" in offensive nuclear arms. Indeed, such reductions are increasingly admitted to be crucial to the success of the defensive weapons the administration also seeks. Paul Nitze, the coordinator of administration arms control policy, even said in a recent speech that "widespread deployments" of defenses would "accompany" the "global elimination of nuclear weapons" as a means of assuring against cheating.

Many observers have concluded that talk of radical reductions is just talk, unlikely to lead to any actual diminishing of nuclear arsenals. But the new Soviet leadership might be able to force such reductions if it played its cards properly.

The Soviets clearly see the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") as an enormous obstacle to new agreements. But what if the Soviet Union decided to try to preempt and preclude Star Wars deployment through an agreement on reductions of offensive weapons? For example, the Soviets might propose a program of continuing, progressively deeper cuts in offensive weapons that would continue only as long as the United States refrains from field testing or deploying Star Wars systems prohibited by the 1972 treaty banning antiballistic missile systems. A well-designed program of annual reductions of 5 percent in each side's inventory of nuclear warheads would lead to substantial reductions in a relatively brief period of time, and could politically tie up Star Wars. This might be the Soviet ace in the hole — a strategy of Arms Control Embrace (ACE).

Of course to make such a proposal the Soviets would have to overcome their first instinct, which was outlined in Washington recently by Col. Gen. Nikolai F. Chervov of the Soviet general staff. If the United States proceeds with Star Wars, Chervov said, the Soviet Union will respond by adding new capabilities on its offensive arsenal. It's not surprising that a Soviet general would [illegible] more offense that could overcome them. Indeed, this has been the traditional approach of both superpowers, and explains why they adopted the 1972 ABM Treaty.

But the Star Wars defense will be a long time building, and to respond to it with new offensive weapons, the Soviets will have to come up with new kinds of offensive weapons and new tactics anyway — so reductions of existing offensive systems could still be possible.

The ACE strategy is also consistent with the Soviet use of arms control to moderate U.S.-Soviet relations.

It is, of course, precisely this "bear hug" approach that is often feared by hawks opposing arms control, on the grounds that relaxation of tension will really mean relaxation of American vigilance. On the other hand, steady reductions over a long period of time would be Pentagon signed off on at least several years of this percentage-annual-reduction shrinkage of SALT II limits.

It can be shown mathematically that shrinking SALT II by 50 percent would achieve most of the goals set by President Reagan in his 1982 Eureka College speech that called for, among other things, reducing ballistic missile warheads to about 5,000. And while the Reagan administration called the SALT II Treaty "fatally flawed," the principal flaw now cited was the treaty's failure to include disarmament, which a proposal to shrink SALT II would repair.

Moreover, an agreement of this kind would be easy to negotiate — it only requires agreement on a single percentage. Proposing it would give the Soviets both the moral high ground in this round of negotiations, and a real prospect of heading off

Steady reductions over a long period of time would be an appealing idea, bound to have many supporters in this country, thus making it harder to reject.

SUNDAY, MARCH 17, 1985 THE WASHINGTON POST

an appealing idea, bound to find many supporters in this country, thus making it harder to reject.

Indeed, there has already been considerable support in the this country for the idea of progressive, steady reductions. In 1979, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously supported a resolution urging Moscow and Washington to pursue ". . . continuous year-by-year reductions in the ceilings and subceilings under the [SALT II] treaty so as to take advantage of the treaty already negotiated and to begin a sustainable and effective process of reductions in strategic arms . . ."

At the June 1979 Vienna summit — after six months of Pentagon studies of the proposal — President Carter suggested just such an agreement: a 5 percent per year [illegible] gain of SALT II [illegible] for five years. [illegible] the Soviet arms race that certainly confirms them. Public opinion in Europe and America would surely be impressed by such an offer.

But a successful negotiation along these lines would not have to be seen as a victory for the Russians. On the contrary, it would give President Reagan an enormous triumph — he could describe it as just what he intended all along, real reductions. And he could keep his Star Wars research, provided it stays in the laboratories.

If, after far-reaching reductions, the two sides were willing to accept, wanted to purchase and could figure out how to live with some kind of population defense, the president could get that too.

Finally, for those of us who believe that Star Wars puts us on [illegible]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Jeremy. Brent Scowcroft.

STATEMENT OF GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

General SCOWCROFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess by the process of elimination, according to the title of the book, I have already been labeled this morning.

I think one of the outstanding features of this book, however, is that people from all complexions can broadly agree on much of the agenda aside from the philosophical view that they espouse. It is indeed an outstanding book, which is not surprising given the authors.

I subscribe broadly to the owl agenda and to the irrational likelihood of precipitation of nuclear war. I think the one thing the book tends to do, while each time I think there is a hole in it and they fill up the hole in the next page or two, I think it is a kind of rational approach to dealing with the irrational, and it tends to leave out the fact that this is a competitive process between the two sides and, as the authors themselves have pointed out, that each side in many cases is trying to force the burden of prudence on the other side. And, therefore, not all rational attempts to deal with the irrational can, in fact, work. It is, nonetheless, useful to try.

I was concerned by, I hope just the grammar of something Graham Allison said, but if not, I think it is a fundamental difference. He used the term "Defend American interests by avoiding nuclear war." I think that is the wrong formulation. I think the proper formulation is "Defend American interests while avoiding nuclear war." Because grammatically the first says all you have to do is avoid nuclear war and you have defended American interests.

I think the real dilemma we face is in the face of a Soviet Union that does not wish us well, how do we protect our vital interests without blowing up the world.

DETERRENCE

That leads me to the one problem I have with the book, and that is the comment that deterrence probably will not work forever. No one knows whether it will or will not, but I think that presumption on its face lacks a lot of the validity of much of the rest of the book.

And I think one of the problems we face at the present time is that deterrence is under attack both from the right and from the left, and I think we need to be very concerned about moves to replace what is admittedly a less than satisfying doctrine.

Deterrence is what we have relied on. It has to be preserved, at least at present through the development of weapon systems and at least the perceived will to use them to defend vital interests. We can help stabilize deterrence by developing weapons which themselves do not contribute to the kinds of instabilities which the authors have pointed to, weapons which are not survivable, command and control which is not survivable, weapons which have very high value and, thus, provide an incentive for first strike, and then the whole panoply of what have come to be known as confidence building, confidence building measures.

One of the problems with confidence building measures of many kinds, while I think they must be pursued, they have to be done with the realization of this competitive world in which we live.

Communication about the stakes involved, I agree that one of the most likely precipitating events to a conflict is the misperception of the stakes involved. And yet, each side is likely under some circumstances to try to communicate, maybe not falsely, but in less than a clear way that its stakes are or the stakes themselves may change depending on the actions of the other.

So that even what appear to be the very obvious kinds of things turn out on close examination not to be so simple. I would certainly urge that we pursue this agenda, that we do analyze thoughtfully and logically what steps we can take, but not with the idea that we are going to solve the problem.

At the end, I would just urge the authors to pursue what they dealt with in the book more tangentially, and that is to write another book about what to do if nuclear weapons are used, because by and large, by and large, we have been operating under the assumption that if nuclear weapons are used, escalation is inevitable, and everything dissolves. Thus, we have made few military and political preparations for managing, controlling, for terminating, for reversing the process, like terminating the nuclear release thing, for example, because our assumption is once you release them, everything is off.

I think most concentration on what is admittedly a disagreeable subject, a subject we have avoided because we would be accused of fostering nuclear war, is nonetheless a suitable second step to a very worthy enterprise.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Brent.

Let me ask if any of the authors would like to talk about any points raised by Jeremy Stone or Brent Scowcroft.

Mr. ALLISON. Perhaps I will say a word to Brent's points and let Joe pick up a couple points to Jeremy's just quickly.

I think that essentially I agree with the main points that Brent made, and in trying to be brief I didn't say all the things I would like to say. But, the first proposition is certainly right. The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is essentially competitive. And in that competition, the United States has chosen to be free, at peace but with some risk of nuclear war.

HOW MUCH RISK IS ACCEPTABLE?

So then the question is how much risk it is prudent to accept, and where we may be tolerating unacceptable risks that could be avoided if we were willing to pay for an alternative. For example, take the reliance on the first use of weapons in Europe or the battlefield nuclear weapons. We buy defense on the cheap at the risk of using nuclear weapons.

There exists a conventional alternative, as Al has discussed with the battlefield nuclear weapons, that would achieve virtually the same objective, yet reduce the risks of an unauthorized or accidental risk. This just costs a little bit more money. That has been the dilemma of NATO for about four decades. How much risk do we

want to run to defend our interests, at what price? So, it is just a matter of haggling about the price. And we say in the book that we should pay a little more to reduce the risks a little more with respect to that.

On the second question that Brent raises about whether a proper locution is "to defend American interests by avoiding nuclear war" or "to defend American interests while avoiding nuclear war," I will not argue with him about the language that much.

I think that "by" if it suggests all we have to do is to avoid nuclear war to defend American interests, it is incorrect. We want both American interests and no nuclear war. "While" may seem too weak, because it is important to recognize that if we fail that one test, avoiding a nuclear war, we will not pursue or defend any other American interest. That is a certain way to close the game down. So, it is a test, an absolute test that has to be met in the relationship.

I could go over the other points, but maybe I will stop and let Joe say a word to Jeremy's points.

Mr. NYE. On Jeremy Stone's offering support in the clothing he offered, I should say when you have an agenda for reducing risks of nuclear war, you accept support in any guise in which it comes. So, we are delighted.

But let me point out that the argument that the owls are just doves in different clothing is a little bit misleading.

For example, owls do not necessarily worry about the modernization of forces, and they do not place the major stress on the arms race, per se. Indeed, a strong historical case could be made that the arms race between Germany and Britain was over in 1912, and that what happened in August 1914 was a failure of operations for controlling large military forces.

So, in that sense in our book we do not come out for the freeze, and we do urge modernization of forces. That is usually not identified as dovish.

Mr. STONE. Excuse me, Joe. I did not say a dove in a different guise. I said doves with blinders. On those agenda items, I agree were.

Mr. NYE. There is a different position here. But the important point is not whether we start in the same place but whether we can agree on moving the agenda that we have discussed. And if it has been around for 20 years, then the hard puzzle is why is it not in anybody's in-box. And if 6 of these 10 things do not require agreement with the Soviets, why haven't they moved?

And there I would tend to agree with him. That there is an underattended part of the agenda of steps that we can do for reducing the risks of nuclear war. Three networks send full teams to Geneva just to cover the resumption of talks on structural arms control, the public is being miseducated about what are the things that can be done.

There are a whole series of important things to be done in addition to formal arms control cuts in Geneva. And if Jeremy and others would like to help us push those, I would welcome their support.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, and thank all of the members of the panel.

Bud Hillis.

Mr. HILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly have found this a very stimulating discussion this morning. I look forward to reading the book that you gentlemen have written. I suppose in my own personal philosophy I come down on the side of the hawk, but one who characterizes himself as a well-armed dove, if there can be such a characterization.

But, I viewed the problem—first of all, let me begin by saying that Mr. Shevchenko sat at this table not too long ago, and I got the opportunity to ask him, you know, that a few American Presidents I can remember talked about banishing nuclear arms from the face of the Earth as a worthy goal, and that in his view of the Soviet Union was this possible, and he said decidedly not because the large ICBM is to the Soviet Union the real caricature of power, of world importance, of being a super power, and that they will never give it up.

In view of that, I came to the conclusion nuclear weapons as we know them are here to stay whether we like it or not, and we can debate nuclear freezes, we can talk about abolishing and abandoning them, and perhaps we should have that as a goal for the saving of mankind, but in the realities of life we are going to have to learn how to live with them. And I think that, as I understand, is a lot of what your book is about.

Now, one area that has worried me as much personally in the nuclear area, I think that we can probably negotiate and communicate with the Soviets, and except for some very unforeseen circumstances, avoid through deterrence nuclear war. But how about nuclear proliferation and the use of a nuclear weapons either by an ally of ours or an ally of theirs, perhaps in a local conflict, or in a conflict in which we have interest. I think of the Middle East situation, or between India and Pakistan, or any area of the world. What is going to happen then and what do the owls have to say? How do we avoid that, that area of potential trouble?

Mr. ALLISON. Let me pick up the first half of the question and then ask one of my colleagues if they want to answer on the second one.

ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The first point you make is a fundamental point, and we have had two presidents—first, President Carter, and then President Reagan—who said that their hope is to banish nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth. We do not disagree with that hope. We, indeed, say at the conclusion of the book that is a hope much to be desired, and we are, in fact, going to turn our attention now to exploring ways to at least reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence. But could we imagine how that could possibly occur? Answer: We cannot imagine so today. I remember in fact when President Carter first articulated that, I think that it was in one of the inaugural or State of the Union addresses. My nephew was around and said, "Is he serious?" I said, "I think he is." And he said, "You do not think that we should hide just one?"

Now the notion of disinventing nuclear weapons is moot. Our main and first point is that we are at a level of nuclear arsenals

that is so robust in deterring a deliberate attack, that there is a whole other piece of the agenda that is much more important, just as you say.

And to pick up Jeremy's point. It is not Al's point of view that reducing nuclear weapons arsenals by half would not be important politically, but that is where you are getting the impact, and there are a lot of other things that would have political impact. But the proposition focuses on use.

On the question of proliferation and the risks that come out of that. Al, will you pick up?

Mr. CARNESALE. Yes. Proliferation is 1 of the 10 main areas in which we offer recommendations. We share your concern. I would distinguish the use of nuclear weapons by one of the existing nuclear states from the matter of the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. Both problems have to be addressed.

For example, we propose that there be bilateral hot lines with each of the other nuclear weapon states. Then, in case accidential or unauthorized use, there could be instant communication and people would know what was going on and how to avoid escalation.

In terms of proliferation itself, we have to walk a fine line between complacency and fatalism. All too often we hear that things are going fine. Twenty years ago, people thought there would be 30 or 40 nuclear countries by now. John Kennedy thought that by the mid-1970's there would be 15 to 25 such countries. It turned out that there are only 5, 6, or 7, and everything is fine. Those who hold this complacent view may tend to relax, which is a great danger.

The other approach which is just as bad is fatalism. Some say that you cannot keep this proliferation genie in the bottle, or that the horse is out of the barn. There may be 6 or 7 horses out of the barn, but that means that 150 horses are still in the barn. It is worth trying to keep the barn door closed.

Now for some concrete steps that you might take. The most important is maintaining the security guarantees that we have. For example, imagine if the United States were to withdraw from Europe, or if the Europeans were to perceive that we had really withdrawn our security guarantee. How long do you think it would be before those nations or Japan had their own nuclear weapons? Those security guarantees must not be taken lightly.

A second action is to support the nonproliferation regime. We do have an extensive regime. We have a nonproliferation treaty with over 110 countries that are party to it. We have got to do everything that we can to strengthen it. And indeed, we may soon have to start to worry about just keeping it alive, let alone strengthening it.

A third area is sanctions. It is a dirty word; one that countries do not like to talk about. What do you do in the case of the next proliferator? Is there some action on which nations might agree in advance, whether it be economic, political, or indeed possibly technological or military.

And finally, an area to be guarded against is nuclear terrorism. It may well be that, with the tens of thousands of weapons that are around the world, we will have to worry not only about terrorist groups or other states building their own, but stealing one.

Nuclear terrorism threats can no longer be dismissed as implausible. And so we have to guard against them, and strengthen the safeguards that surround not only our nuclear facilities, but also our nuclear weapons themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. Ike Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Out of curiosity, Dr. Carnesale, are you a history professor?

Mr. CARNESALE. A history professor?

Mr. SKELTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARNESALE. No; I am a professor of public policy in the school of government, but my Ph.D. happens to be in nuclear engineering.

Mr. SKELTON. I ask that because you seem to deemphasize surprise type of attacks. And I think that our history may emphasize it far more than you do, sir. I am not just talking about Pearl Harbor, Poland, invasion of Soviet Union, North Korea going into South Korea, the Argentine invasion of the Falklands. I think that you would probably find more situations like that than World War I that got out of hand or the Vietnam war that got out of hand situation.

I suggest that in your review of this book when it is updated, that you may want to take a look at history a little bit closer, and look at the surprise attack situation.

I am concerned about another premise that you gentlemen have, to defend American interests by avoiding nuclear war, defend American interests while avoiding nuclear war. It probably should be cut off and just say let us define American interests, and hopefully avoid nuclear war.

I think that a good reading of Clauswitz might also help you rewrite another chapter in that regard.

Be that as it may, I am looking over this table that I have been furnished, your "Hawks, Doves, and Owls." And I would like to ask about a couple of issues, and maybe see if you can give us a couple of examples, and I will let you pick who wishes to answer them.

No. 2 is, "Obtain a credible conventional deterrent." That, of course, makes imminent sense to strengthen NATO or RDF. I do not pretend that nuclear weapons deter nuclear war. We understand those things.

What you raise is No. 1, do not provoke the Soviet Union; and No. 2, do raise the nuclear threshold. In that order, I wish that you gentleman would discuss those, give us examples, and why, please.

Mr. CARNESALE. If I may address the first question about surprise attack, the first point.

Mr. SKELTON. Yes.

DANGER OF SURPRISE ATTACK

Mr. CARNESALE. Of course, the scenarios that we were addressing were for major nuclear war. I share your view about history. We learn that in conventional war, to the extent possible the aggressor seeks surprise. That is absolutely true.

But in the nuclear realm, if one looks at major nuclear war and surprise attack, it is difficult to conceive what the attacker gains. Because, even if he launches a superb first strike—absolutely

superb, as good as you can imagine—there remain many thousands of nuclear weapons that can be rained on his country.

So it is not a question of dismissing history, but saying the all-out surprise attack in a nuclear context just does not seem to be a rational decision. That does not preclude it being done irrationally.

Mr. SKELTON. Doctor, what tells you that the beginning, the waging, and conclusion of war are always rational decisions?

Mr. CARNESALE. It does not preclude the irrational.

Mr. SKELTON. I think that history is replete with decisions made by leaders throughout the centuries that are not rational.

Mr. CARNESALE. Right, we agree with that.

Mr. SKELTON. Second-guessing what they would and would not do, and they were wrong many times, because they lose the war. So I do not think that you can preclude that, sir.

Mr. CARNESALE. Well, I agree. That is what I said. We were talking about an irrational leader who could indeed decide to launch a surprise attack. On the other hand, there is nothing that you will do to deter the irrational leader, Deterrence is a rational concept. But I cannot contend that by my being stronger I will make an irrational leader more rational.

Mr. SKELTON. We might disagree on that point, sir. Go ahead.

Mr. CARNESALE. All right. Let me address the question of provocation. What we had in mind, for example, was the view held by some that the United States should adopt a policy and a force structure commensurate with being able to wage conventional warfare with the Soviet Union in places where they might be weak. This is the so-called horizontal escalation strategy.

We believe that the kinds of forces that you would need to implement such a strategy would necessarily be perceived as threatening aggressive forces by the other side, because the capability for aggressive action would be there.

We believe that because the Soviets see Eastern Europe as a vital interest of theirs, our developing forces which clearly threaten the Soviets' military hold on Eastern Europe would not be in our interests.

RAISING THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD

Mr. ALLISON. If I could pick up the second point on raising the nuclear threshold, because as you said, it falls under the principle of obtaining a credible conventional deterrent. We believe that that is a provocative proposition. The first one is to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent which we say is relatively easy given the level of forces. But the second proposition is to obtain something that we do not have, a credible conventional deterrent.

Presently, in NATO, in order to defend our interests and our allies' interests, we run the risk of using nuclear weapons. Indeed we have quite a large number of battlefield nuclear weapons distributed around Europe, in order to defend against a conventional attack.

Now is that technologically necessary? No. Is it economically necessary? Well, it is cheaper. That is what it has to recommend it. Indeed, NATO has for four decades been unwilling to pay the price for a safe defense.

Mr. SKELTON. Along that same line, Doctor, along that same line, the fact that we do not have a credible capability in the binary gas field, would that be part of the conventional deterrence of which you speak?

Mr. ALLISON. I think that there is yet another domain, as you say, in the area of gas which is another Pandora's box.

Mr. SKELTON. But not having a credible gas capability, does that not lower the nuclear threshold or raise the nuclear threshold, whichever way you want to say it, and in essence make it more likely that a commander or President whatever the case may be would use that if gas was used against us?

Mr. ALLISON. I think that the answer is that that is correct. I think there is one of the very tough tradeoffs as you look at it is between your conventional forces, your chemical forces, and your nuclear forces. We say that for NATO, having four times the GNP of its adversary, it is only a matter of will and money to have a credible conventional deterrent which we wish we would have.

Mr. SKELTON. Well, you are not answering my question.

Mr. ALLISON. I am sorry.

Mr. SKELTON. Would you recommend binary capability in the West, in NATO?

CHEMICAL CAPABILITIES

Mr. NYE. I just spent the weekend, Congressman, at a meeting in Berlin with a group of Europeans discussing exactly these issues. My own feeling is that the answer to that is yes, that you will need a modernization of our conventional capability including chemical capabilities. Because I believe that merely producing defensive gear does not meet the real question, which is not the lethality of chemicals, but is the conventional force capability that is degraded by protective measures if the one side has it and the other side does not.

I also found that many of the Europeans were equally concerned about this, because they believe that the argument that we would respond with nuclear weapons was not credible, and that this would provide a serious chink in NATO's conventional defense capabilities. But at the same time, they were saying that the politics of it was impossible; that to do something openly about introducing new chemical stocks in Europe now would produce more danger and damage to the alliance than it was worth.

So we are caught in a very difficult dilemma in which, from an analytical point of view, it strikes me that there are good reasons that we should indeed develop these capabilities. And yet from a sense of political prudence, we have to be awfully careful about our timing.

I should add one footnote about the questions of defense budgets, since at this meeting everybody more or less agreed that the period of growth in defense budgets was over from sometime, and that the demographics were also stable.

But what was made clear at this meeting is that there are still a number of things that we could do with conventional force improvements and technologies that are not that expensive which could allow us to remove battlefield nuclear weapons. Such systems

as AQUILA, the remotely piloted vehicle for real time targeting. It is estimated to cost something like $2 to $3 billion a year. That is not a large amount of money in the defense budget.

And even though we might need a period of static defense budgets, the question is will our research and development and will some of the changes that are necessary to meet a clear and present danger on the central front in Europe take our attention, or will we spend our money and our political attention on issues like the strategic defense initiative which are far off into the future.

You can make a strong case from this meeting of Europeans that if we want to do something to reduce nuclear war, we should spend more time on what you might call a tactical defense initiative than on a strategic defense initiative.

Mr. SKELTON. Very good, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ray.

Mr. RAY. Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you and thank you for bringing this outstanding panel before us today. And gentlemen, your testimony and comments this morning have been just excellent. There is one question that I had which was pretty well asked and answered by you by Mr. Skelton there.

And that is would the lack of a strong chemical deterrent push NATO toward the use of nuclear weapons in the event of an attack, a chemical warfare attack. That was a concern that I had, and one that I hear expressed more and more. And it seemed to me to be a real danger throughout the world.

Mr. ALLISON. If I could pick up just a piece of that one. I think that I agree with what my colleague, Joe Nye, says. But basically, what one is trying to do is get a robust defense across the spectrum including conventional weapons, chemical weapons, and nuclear weapons.

Now if you said "Where is weakest chink in the armor?", I think that, as Joe finally concluded, in the conventional area it is still the case, and leave chemicals aside for the moment, but I agree with the answer on chemicals, but leave those aside for the moment. Just in the conventional area, if there were a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO, NATO is currently positioned, and planned, and weapons distributed, to use nuclear weapons first to defend against the conventional attack.

Why? Because we do not pay the price of an adequate conventional attack. There is a good, long agenda of conventional actions, of actions that could be taken in terms of strengthening our conventional forces that would reduce the risks of nuclear war. But instead, we have chosen to, in effect, as I say, have defense on the cheap. Not avoiding the chemical proposition, but there are pieces of the conventional agenda, there are pieces of the chemical agenda, and pieces of the nuclear agenda, each of which the impact we say would be to reduce risks of nuclear war.

Mr. RAY. I think that those comments are real good, and would you think that the NATO allies are leaning too heavily on the nuclear deterrent in order to prevent the expenditure of more and heavier sums for conventional weapons?

Mr. ALLISON. I think not only our NATO allies, but I think we ourselves.

Mr. RAY. Thank you, sir. Yes, sir.

General SCOWCROFT. If I could just add one point, Mr. Ray, on that chemical business. I think that chemical weapons in some sense are unique. And that is that they are really advantageous tactically against an unprepared enemy. Chemical weapons are not particularly useful when both sides are fully prepared to use and defend against them.

And therefore, not to have chemical defense or the chemical capability tends to invite the use of chemical weapons, because they are devastating against an unprepared foe.

Mr. RAY. Thank you, General.

Mr. ALLISON. John Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Following up the same line of questioning about chemical weapons. I spent the weekend with some British Parliamentarians, and have spent a couple of sessions here with some Bundestag Parlimentarians, and the issue of chemical weapons frequently comes up.

It seems to me that the Europeans feel fairly secure beneath our nuclear umbrellas, so that they can debate issues without the responsibility of being faced with the consequences. Namely, they can talk about whether or not they will have the Pershing II's or the cruise missiles, because there is a much broader umbrella over their little parasol there in Europe that protects them.

Why not in taking Alliance politics seriously as you propose, allocate some responsibilities within the NATO Alliance where the allies have the first responsibility, primary responsibility. Let us start with chemical weapons, for example. That is the likely theater for the use of chemical weapons in Europe. The need is there. The Europeans are faced to live cheek by jowl with the threat.

Why not say to them that the need is apparent, it is obvious, the political problem is the deployment of these weapons on your soil. It would be far better, therefore, if you took the initiative, develop the weapons, and we will leave the license for production to you, or we will buy the chemical weapons from you.

Is that not one of the corollaries of the precepts that you set out here?

Mr. NYE. I think your suggestion sense in the reasoning that is behind it, which is that we should not get out too far in front of the Europeans on this. Sometimes when we try to solve a technical problem, we wind up making a political problem much larger than it is.

My own feeling, however, is if you follow that strategy perfectly, not much is going to happen. I suggest that what we have to do is develop certain capabilities, and then find the time and methods in which we then perhaps introduce those capabilities, but that should be determined by the Europeans.

I feel that if we leave the whole initiative to the Europeans on this that nothing will happen.

Mr. SPRATT. Well, see, the Bundestag members were telling us last year there there is a certain neurosis in Europe, because we are not responsible for our own fate. We really are subordinate to your decisions. We tag along with your defense policies. Thrust them up forward with at least one fairly minor issue, nuclear weapons. It may be that they will not take the initiative on it.

But they certainly will not take the initiative on anything if we keep taking the brunt of it for them. They were the ones who proposed cruise missiles and Pershing II's and we came forward with our part of the deal and they got weak-kneed about it. So let us say as to chemical weapons, you do it, we will back you up, and we will then buy our end of what you produce and deploy it.

I do not think that they would follow through in the near-term, but it would save us another political embarrassment. Even the conservative members of the Bundestag say to us when they come here, let us not bring up in the present context right now the issue of chemical weapons.

Mr. NYE. We had three members of the Bundestag with us in this discussion, and I think that the rationale of what you are saying is absolutely correct. The timing is probably not correct.

Mr. SPRATT. Let me ask you one other question. One of your precepts is take decapitation seriously.

Does that mean that we also should have a decapitation strategy?

DECAPITATION STRATEGY

Mr. CARNESALE. The answer is no: we should not have a decapitation strategy. Indeed, we have another recommendation that says "don't decapitate."

Let me say two things. First of all, we think it is important for the United States to assure that our leadership can survive. And we have some specific recommendations there. For example, we should get the Vice President out of the Capitol in time of crisis rather than having him sitting in the White House chairing the crisis management meeting.

At the same time, we believe it would not be in our interest to decapitate the Soviet side in time of conflict. At the very minimum we want somebody there to be able to issue the cease-fire order, or the "I surrender" order.

That is quite different from not having a decapitation capability, so that the decisionmaker on the other side knows that nuclear war can get him too. It's up to us. But we would advise against actually employing decapitation as a strategy or a doctrine.

Mr. SPRATT. Will that ambiguity not—the Russians— I mean we are saying on the one hand, we are buying hard target retaliatory weapons. We want to—and the SIOP says we want to tell the guy who pushes the button in the Kremlin we are coming after you first?

Mr. CARNESALE. No. We have never said that. What we have said is we can decapitate if we want to. It's up to us. We also threaten industrial centers, economic centers, and hard and soft military targets.

It is not as if we have a doctrine that if conflict comes we push all the buttons. We want to be able to do many things, including to be able to launch a decapitation strike.

That's quite different from having a doctrine that says we would push the decapitation button. We believe that from a war termination point of view, decapitation is a bad idea.

Mr. SPRATT. What I am saying is if we have the weapons that enable us to decapitate, then the Soviets will look upon those weapons as a strategy of decapitation regardless of our spoken and articulated doctrine.

Mr. CARNESALE. That's fine. I want them to worry about the possibility that if they initiate a nuclear war, we could destroy the leaders that made that decision. And I want us to have that capability.

I think it adds to our deterrence. But if you ask me if there is a conflict, should we decapitate the Soviets? My advice would be "no."

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you.

General SCOWCROFT. May I just comment on that?

I don't think it is a good idea for deterrence to have a decapitation strategy because it induces the other side to lower the level of command and control, to evolve the command and control upon lower level people out of fear that a successful decapitation strategy might take place unless they had fallback, fail dangerous procedures to permit the arms of the octopus to fire in case the head were decapitated.

So I think this whole notion of encouraging decapitation is antideterrence, and encourages more unauthorized action and more accidential action in crises when they devolve the control to these lower level people to protect against this threat.

Mr. SPRATT. Well, I have heard it said that the Soviets have more to fear from a decapitation strategy on our part than we do because our country is so—has so many prolific centers of action and politically is so dispersed. Whereas theirs is so concentrated in Moscow that if we had such a strategy it would constitute a greater threat to them than theirs would to us.

Consequently, it ought to be somehow part of our nuclear strategy.

General SCOWCROFT. The decapitation isn't about cities or urban centers. It's about the command and control. And in both sides that is rigidly centralized in one place. To encourage it to be dispersed around is not—

Mr. SPRATT. Well, I know but the decapitation of their leadership would lead possibly to the fragmentation of their country.

And let's assume that, you know, somehow or another the war is limited. In our country, we would probably have more centers of action so that the country could regenerate politically and otherwise afterwards.

General SCOWCROFT. Right. I think, Mr. Spratt, there are two different things in the discussion here. Usually, decapitation refers to decapitation of the command and control authorities and an effort to disrupt the prosecution of the war.

What you are talking about is a threat that cropped up a few years ago in our posture statements to destroy all the Communist Party functionaries so that the country would fall apart afterwards. That's a different kind if strategy and has to do with attacking all the central committee headquarters in all the urban regions in the Soviet Union.

It doesn't have strategic implications. It is something quite different.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Ray would like to ask one.

Mr. RAY. Mr. Chairman, if I could just follow up on the chemical terror, just with one question here or one comment or two.

It seems to me that we face a danger, or maybe a threat to the organization of NATO because we don't have the—this country, of course, is having to spend great sums in training and clothing and preparation. Our country becomes more and more disinterested in—against this Congress approving any kind of chemical weapon or deterrent.

And it would seem to me that somewhere down the line there is going to be some threats raised against NATO since it is on their soil, and they are so adamant against storing weapons, manufacturing weapons, or letting us store them there, that there is going to have to be some sort of a way that we force this particular system on the NATO allies.

Why should we, as has been pointed out, having to support chemical—the development of new chemical weapons. But why should we continue to subject ourselves here to harassment, and continuing embarrassment by defeats when our own allies over there who we are trying to protect primarily will not support us.

I just see that as a great threat down the road, and for instance, we may even—similar to the Nunn amendment or something of this nature we may even decide that why should we put families and continuing numbers of troops in the alliance over there if they are going to be subjected to possible chemical warfare contamination.

I just wanted to make those comments, see if you had any following comments.

Mr. CARNESALE. It is not a bad approximation to assume that the Europeans by and large oppose any change in the status quo. If you want to put troops into Europe, they don't like it. If you want to take troops out of Europe, they don't like it.

If you want to put nuclear weapons in, they don't like it. If you want to take nuclear weapons out, they don't like it. If you want to put chemical weapons in, they don't like it. If you wanted to take chemical weapons out, they wouldn't like it.

The status quo from their point of view is that war is unthinkable. They would like it to remain that way.

I think that explains their reaction to chemical weapons. In large part it explains their reaction to the enhanced radiation weapon. It explains their initial reaction to the strategic defense initiative. I think it explains their reaction to most things that might be perceived as a major change in the European theater.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask a couple of things. In your talk about battlefield nuclear weapons, do you make recommendations about how we ought to structure those battlefield nuclear weapons and what we ought to do about them? What does your book say about that?

BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Mr. ALLISON. Basically, the proposition is that we should get the battlefield nuclear weapons, the artillery which we are in the process of modernizing, out of there. And we should substitute for them

emerging technologies as a way of making this realistic in the NATO context. This goes well beyond the Montebello decision.

Indeed, it is contrary to what we are now doing in terms of upgrading. We believe that because those battlefield nuclear weapons run so much of a risk of an unauthorized or accidental use, in the case of a crisis, we should remove them.

You couldn't just remove then, since they are deployed as a part of the NATO alliance in which decisions are made by consensus. You might be able to replace them. And, indeed, in order to keep our deterrent strong, we would replace them with emerging technologies that would achieve the same military mission, and even be slightly more credible of being used, since most commanders don't believe they would ever get release authority for the battlefield nuclear weapons anyhow.

So we would get the battlefield nuclear weapons out.

Mr. NYE. May I add one point to that? One of the benefits of the battlefield nuclear weapons is that they prevent clustering of Soviet conventional forces which then adds to the leverage of our conventional forces. That is a serious benefit.

But we believe that you can obtain a large part of that benefit by using systems which have deeper range, something in the range of 70 miles or more.

And the purpose of that is that if you use systems with longer range to prevent clustering, you have less of this problem that a president will face in a crisis of either predelegating and losing control over units about to be overrun, or else maintaining control and thereby depriving those front units of the ability to fight.

One of the great dilemmas of having standard operating procedures as we have now in which these front line units believe they will be able to use battlefield nuclear weapons, meaning the artillery, is that they do not then develop the conventional capabilities which they need to defend.

In that sense, there is a double danger of having the battlefield nuclear weapons treated as though they were useable weapons, when in practice they would probably not be useable weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. Just the difference that you and Jeremy, Joe were talking about is it Jeremy's position that— Jeremy, is it your position that the existence of large numbers of nuclear weapons and the continual accumulation of larger numbers of nuclear weapons on both sides is a danger in and of itself?

ARMS RACE

Mr. STONE. Not so much the numbers as the qualitative changes that have been going on when we went from 10 hours warning with bombers to 30 minutes with ICBM's to 6 minutes with Pershings.

The CHAIRMAN. But is this a point that you are saying that we are entering—that these new weapons are more destabilizing? Is that leaving aside the effect? You are just saying the qualitative and quantitative increase in weapons is a danger in and of itself?

Suppose that we are increasing the capabilities of essentially stabilizing weapons—I mean they didn't add any instabilities to the system.

Would it still bother you that we are increasing the quality and the quantity of these?

Mr. STONE. Not per se, no. But the problem is I think—let's phrase it this way.

The doves view the arms race as a kind of festering sore waiting to be infected. Some of the things that may be put on this wound may be poultices, but from time to time, if it is left the way it is, it will become infected.

Some of the new things invented will be sadly destabilizing and unable to be controlled. And so we view it as a simple common sense view that it would be better to stop the arms race to the extent it can be stopped, and we consider it a simple common sense view that the arms race like all other arms races will not go on forever.

And so we consider it an absolutely fundamental part of what is to be done, is to try to slow the momentum of it. But many people have grown up in the last 40 years with the arms race as mood music, and think that somehow it will go on for the rest of time simply because it's been there for the whole time they have been there.

And I think they tend to look at this with too short a time perspective. I think the agreements we have had so far, Mr. Chairman, have been salutory, and I am all for more agreements so long as they are good agreements.

Mr. ALLISON. Mr. Chairman, if I could pick the point up because I think that Jeremy was about to persuade me that maybe owls are only doves with blinders, but now he reminds me again that doves are doves.

The dove believes as Jeremy just said that the arms race is a festering sore, and that we somehow need to close down the arms race if we are going to avoid nuclear war.

The hawk, as I think Brent has already told us, says, look, this is a fundamental competition. And whoever is ahead in it is going to be better off. I think we believe there is something right about the dove's proposition, and something right about the hawk's proposition.

But if you look at the arms control agreements that we have reached to date, it is clear that they simply constrain, not eliminate, a competition that is destined to continue for a long time. We see no way in the short run, that is the next 10 years, or 20 years, or 30 years, that nuclear weapons can be made obsolete or disappear. This leads us to focus on another agenda—the owls' agenda.

What affects the probability of the use of these weapons, whether they are about at the current level or about twice that many or about half that many? Numbers of weapons are not unimportant, because of the political implications of agreements. But there are a lot of other things that affect the probability of use besides numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask the question of the one that Brent raised earlier on the issue of the long range of deterrence. What does your book or your proposition say about the long range possibilities of deterrence surviving? What are you saying about that?

What did you quote in the book, Brent? You said there is some quote in there that says that deterrence can't last forever or something.

General SCOWCROFT. Something.

DETERRENCE

Mr. CARNESALE. Of our 51 do's and don'ts, the last 2 relate to the longer term. And by the longer term we make clear that we are talking about numbers on the order of 40 years.

In other words, it's been 40 years since nuclear weapons were used, 40 years since World War II. Let's look ahead to the next 40 years. And we say, don't assume that nuclear deterrence will last forever, and do intensify the search for alternatives.

We make clear that we feel deterrence is rather robust, and that we see no reason to believe that it will fail sometime soon. But when we ask ourselves whether we think it will last forever, our answer is "no." Probably not. We reach this view not because we believe that a rational leader is going to wake up one day and decide it's a good day for a nuclear war. We reach it when we think of the system that supports deterrence, the sheer numbers of the weapons, the number of people, the imperfection of the institutions, the technologies, the organizations, and the individuals. It is likely that eventually one of those elements would fail. We don't have a solution, and we share Brent's concern. Deterrence may be a fragile shield, but it's the only shield we have right now. We must not weaken it as we search for alternatives.

We have identified three paths for exploration. One is the technological path, which includes not only defensive systems but also possible changes in the structure of offensive forces.

Second is the political path. For example, the British have nuclear weapons, and they could easily destroy every American city on the east coast. We don't worry about that. A transformation in the United States-Soviet political relationship over the long term is not unimagineable to reduce the threat if not the levels of forces themselves.

The third path, which may be the fuzziest of all, we call social development. This path might lead to changes in attitudes about nuclear weapons and the need for deterrence.

We consider the political path to be the most promising. We doubt that nuclear weapons will either disappear magically through disarmament, or that they will be made impotent and obsolete.

The CHAIRMAN. Joe, you were going to say something?

Mr. NYE. Yes. Let me add one thing on that. I subscribe to what Al said. But the danger that we sometimes run into is people saying that because of Murphy's law and human fallibility, the breakdown of deterrence is inevitable.

No matter how small the probability there will be infinitely horrible consequence, and therefore we must take drastic steps now. That formulation is not what we mean in the book, and that formulation is misleading.

I don't think the people who say that actually have thought carefully about what they are saying. I suspect they don't really mean

any number no matter how low. Because if, for example, you could buy 800 or 8,000 years, I suspect that humans would be thinking about very different things than nuclear deterrence by that point.

So trying to take steps to reduce nuclear risk so that you can reduce the probability of failure, so that you buy extra time, strikes me as a very sensible thing.

The second point is that when you say deterrence will someday fail, it may not fail in the form of a total holocaust.

People generally assume that if deterrence fails it means the end of the world. What Brent said is exactly right. We have to think a lot harder about how we take steps to make sure that if an accident occurs, or an inadvertent war begins, that we know how to stop it and stop it early so that in fact it is a small failure of deterrence, not a large one.

Indeed, if one is trying to be speculative about something over 20, 40, 50 years, it may well be that a small breakdown of deterrence will change the political dimensions to put into place far more serious steps.

And that small breakdown in deterrence may not occur between the United States and the Soviet Union, but between two Third World countries.

So the statement that deterrence will inevitably fail because humans are fallible and Murphy's law is the first law of government, may be a correct statement. But we should not read too much into it. And I think that is what Brent was saying.

The CHAIRMAN. Brent, did you have something else?

General SCOWCROFT. Yes. I think what they say about trying to look beyond deterrence is reasonable. In the present context, however, I worry a great deal that, you know, we are maybe falling into the trap that Americans frequently do that since there is a problem—and deterrence is a problem. It's unpleasant, unhappy, and so on. But there is a solution.

And we are not going to disinvent nuclear weapons even if we get rid of most or all of them, we have not disinvented them. And we are in the curious circumstance now that we have both the Catholic bishops and Ronald Reagan suggesting the immorality of deterrence.

That really worries me.

The CHAIRMAN. Jeremy.

Mr. STONE. Well, especially for you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues who are political officials and who are charged with the responsibility for the security of the country, I want to note what has in fact been said, and why it seems to me to be such an unsatisfactory prescription for you.

Because the undertones of three of the last comments were that because nuclear weapons are not going to be disinvented, a repeated theme here with which I fully agree, that somehow the status quo more or less is all we are left with.

There is an enormous gap, however, between not disinventing nuclear weapons and having the arms race in the virulent stage it is now. We have ships and battleships and the British and the Japanese do too. They haven't been disinvented, but we don't have this arms race going on with them.

We don't have to disinvent nuclear weapons to end the arms race. Now, there are only three ways that this arms race can end. I put it to you as a mathematician.

It can either end in a nuclear war which no one wants, or it can peter out as some arms races have without a nuclear war. Or, it can be ended in full or in degree by agreement.

Now, since we don't want the nuclear war, and since we can't depend upon it petering out, all of us have to consider it high on our priorities to try to end it by negotiation. In this regard, it is no different from any other quarrel between human beings.

They can either come to blows, or the quarrel can dissipate, or they can try to reach a truce. The possibility of a truce or of a freeze—to use a word that I am sure is considered much smeared by the authors—was one first raised by President Johnson in 1964 when he proposed it, voted affirmatively by the Senate by 72 to 6 in 1970, proposed again in secret by President Carter at the summit.

It's not a crazy idea. It's only a crazy idea, Mr. Chairman, for those strategists—I count myself in part among them—but I certainly count the authors of this book among them, who have been imbedded in a strategic logic that has lacked real vision for a long time.

The strategic logic that we have all been imbedded in now for 20 to 30 years, since the Shelling Halpern book on arms control, has been one which said just take this middle ground we are talking about.

When I called them doves with blinders, I didn't mean they were real doves because they don't have the vision for changing the political context and for ending the arms race that I think is the requirement of politicians.

But they are doves with blinders in the sense that 90 percent of their agenda has long been on the dovish agenda, these technical fixes, and these worries about war breaking out inadvertently. They are what the doves lose sleep over for sure.

The only reason these authors have hammered out or claimed to hammer out a different middle ground is that they have added to 40 agenda items that are in the heart of the doves 10 agenda items which are in the heart of the hawks. And this has hammered out a kind of perhaps new consensus.

But there is not new agenda items here. And the only thing I called for is I am delighted to be winning 9 to 1 on the agenda items. It's fine with me. The only thing that I am concerned about is that it's your job as politicians to change the nature of the confrontation, to change the nature of the context in which this whole thing is going forward.

Because otherwise as Professor Carnesale said, there is a good chance it would eventually blow up.

Mr. STONE. So, it is an intractable problem which has to be made tractable through changes in it. Arms control agreements can make those changes not just by the limits on the weapons as the ABM Treaty did, but by setting the stage for different relationships between the superpowers.

And, so, I think you have got to get before your committee people that are far more politically trained than strategists in order to give you the real advice you need.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me pursue that.

Do you want to respond, Joe?

Mr. NYE. Yes.

I would just say one thing. I think Jeremy is correct, that there is a real intellectual difference here.

We do not believe that the arms race is, indeed, the source of the problem. Arms races can be problems, but many arms races have not led to war.

Look at the historical evidence—I would cite Paul Kennedy's study, the eminent historian at Yale. It shows that it is simply not true that most arms races lead to war.

What we are arguing, essentially, is that you can do a number of things which can reduce risks of nuclear war, and that among the steps that are involved are things which do involve modernization of arms; that stopping armaments or stopping an arms race is a misspecification of the problem, and that one should look much more carefully at—if you want to talk about arms control—at what we call operational arms control rather than the structural arms control, which is inherent behind Jeremy's argument.

On the other hand, where we do have common ground, is with the idea that it is not a matter of technical fixes, but it is a larger political question. And if one looks carefully at the sets of agenda items that we have in the back of the book, many of them, indeed, are political items which involve discussing with the Soviets ways to manage a strategic balance rather than ways of simply cutting levels of arms.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me pursue a question, an issue that Jeremy raised. And let me ask the authors of the book, what is your view of what we now consider conventional arms control approaches—not your new agenda and rather unconventional approach, but the good old-fashioned SALT agreements which we limit numbers of weapons by specific categories?

And, regardless, or maybe it is different whether you have got different levels, whether you do a freeze or deep cuts, or SALT limits, or things like that.

In your view—I take it what Jeremy is saying is that the way to change the political climate is to do that. I mean, you have made one reference, that if we all adopted the George Kennan 50 percent cut, maybe it would not make any difference in our ability to destroy each other, but it might make a big difference in the political arena.

Second, in his recent comment here, he was talking in terms of using this kind of arms, the arms races about weapons, to make the changes.

What is your vision of the role of what we have normally pursued as arms control agreements, and is it harmless pursuit, or is it useful, or how would you characterize it?

Mr. ALLISON. I will try a little bit of that, and then maybe Al—I think on our list we say "Sustain the arms control agreements that we now have."

We think the SALT II agreement is a good agreement. We think the President's statement yesterday was a good one. We are eager to maintain the ABM Treaty, in particular, because for the next 10 or 15 years if the ABM Treaty were abolished the Soviets, would be in a position to take actions that would be very harmful to U.S. interests.

The United States is in no position to take any action that would be harmful to the Soviets. So, that is to our advantage.

We say those are good and important. We would indeed be very pleased if we woke up tomorrow to discover that there had been deep cuts—as per the Kennan Agreement. That would be a good thing. The question is: How important is that in the total spectrum of things, or in the total agenda?

And we say, in terms of the amount of attention that the arms race gets, both by the administration, by a committee like this one, and in the public, at large, it is just out of proportion, because the arms race—and this is, I think, the place where owls do have a substantial difference with doves—we do not believe, or I do not believe, that the arms race is a crucial independent source of the problem.

It is an expression of an underlying political competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. The hope to reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence over the longer run comes from some change in the political relationship– that is one of the paths that Al outlined—in the United States/Soviet competition. I cannot identify any circumstance in which technology will not continue to offer opportunities, which two competitive parties will find some advantage in pursueing.

And so there will be marginal pursuit of advantage on one side or the other. We are interested in constraining that in ways that we can, particularly constraints against destabilizing developments because of our concern about the risks of nuclear war.

We are also concerned about restraining it because we might save some money, which is also a good thing; but we do not think that by constraining the arms race one makes as much impact on either the risks of nuclear war or the nature of the political competition, as Jeremy believes.

Mr. STONE. Can I just point out that Graham agrees with what I am saying whenever he talks about concrete examples, but when he talks in generalities he dismisses as "dovish rhetoric."

For example, two of the authors have noted the importance of preventing the destabilizing effects of star wars construction, and the importance of the ABM Treaty in restraining this, and the fact that you could get inadvertent war out of this.

This is what the doves mean by saying "The arms race is an autonomous source of danger." It is throwing up these star wars systems; they may lead to inadvertent war. This is what we mean when we say that the arms is an "autonomous source of danger." You agree with that in these concrete instances. But when we for-

mulate it as "The arms race is an autonomous source of danger," they say, "Oh, that is poppycock."

They say, "Not all arms races lead to war," which is, of course, is a reductio ad absurdum of what we are saying.

Mr. CARNESALE. Fortunately, Mr. Chairman, we do not have to make a choice between arms control as we have known it and the owls' agenda. This debate over which is more important relates somewhat to time scales, and somewhat to what one believes in one's heart of hearts. But the fact of the matter is that we can all think of some arms control agreements that would reduce the likelihood of nuclear war; and of other arms control agreements that probably would increase the likelihood of nuclear war.

We would all probably favor the former and be opposed to the latter. We can certainly think of arms control agreements that could enhance crisis stability, and make it less attractive to strike first. We have some such agreements on the books now. We can think of others.

You yourself have thought of others and have been a proponent of others. That is worth pursuing.

Simply reducing uncertainties about future threats can save money, and can also reduce the likelihood of the kinds of misperceptions or miscalculations, which could lead to inadvertent war.

At the same time, we have to be careful not to oversell arms control. It is also important that we not restrict ourselves to formal agreements. It may well be that some of the more valuable arms control can be done either independently, tacitly, or in informal arrangements with the Soviet Union.

And, finally, given the centerpiece position which arms control occupies in the superpower relationship—which I personally believe more of a burden than arms control can possibly bear—it probably is an essential ingredient for any cooperative measures we might take with the Soviets in other areas to limit or reduce the risks of nuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN. One final part of this question, and it probably goes beyond what you are looking at in the book, but is it your view that the arms control agreements that we have done so far—ABM, SALT I, SALT II; Brent, get into this, too, OK—has led to—I mean, we all looked ahead and we say, "How do we get out of this box in the long run?"

And I guess you looking at the political option as the most likely way that this will evolve, although it is hard to see how it happens, it is probably easier to imagine that than a technological fix or the sociological one. All right?

So, do arms control agreements promote that kind of political evolution that we are seeking, or does it hinder it?

And I say that, in the light of the enormous fight that has gone on here in the last few days about whether we should—you know, the discussion about extension of keeping SALT II and claims of Soviet cheating and the divisions and the acrimony.

I mean, does step by step work, I guess, is what we are asking.

Mr. ALLISON. I think I could try to answer it, because I think we don't know, but if you ask what the world would be like absent SALT I, SALT II and the ABM Treaty, so we are trying to do that hypothetical history, I don't think there is any doubt the Soviets

would have deployed—just to take the ABM piece of it—a substantial ABM system. It wouldn't have worked very well, but they would have deployed it; we would have felt probably obliged to deploy some things, and therefore you would have that expenditure and interaction.

I think on the offensive forces, one would have additional offensive forces with some substantial impact on the risk of nuclear war from the weapons per se—not particularly, I think—but nonetheless we would have wasted a good bit of money.

If we put arms control front and center, as the mechanism and device, both symbolically, and, in fact, for transforming the United States-Soviet political competition, will it do it?

I think the answer is no.

It should be part of a broader strategy?

The answer is yes, but with very modest expectations about what it does.

If we limit the weapons, if we cut them in half, this will not eliminate the risk of nuclear war. The United States-Soviet relationship is essentially a political competition. Arms control agreements like SALT I or SALT II do not choose this underlying inherent competition. Rather, they are more like squeezing a balloon which then expands in some other direction.

What arms control agreements can do, I believe, is constrain some developments that may be risky to us: a rival will use them to try to constrain us against some developments that may be risky to him.

Each nation is searching within those constraints to do its best for its interests Is there some way to prevent that by an agreement? No. That's inherent in the situation. Unfortunately, since advocates of arms control, and some opponents poured so much symbolically into traditional arms control that it was destined to be declared a great disappointment because it was exaggerated.

It was not the source of the problem, and it is not the source of the solution.

The CHAIRMAN. Any others?

General SCOWCROFT. I would just add. I think one of the things we tend to overlook in arms control is the process itself.

I certainly agree with what Graham has said. We have built up expectations for it. It cannot solve the basic problem, which is political; but, in fact, what it does is tend to make the whole process more transparent, and while there is a lot of acrimony about Soviet cheating and this and that and the other, there is no question that the Soviets know where our points of neuralgia are now; and we know where theirs are.

And the process of discussion, and so on, I think, makes the whole strategic balance a little bit clearer to both sides; and, if we did not have that, I think we would tend to increase paranoia and fear of the unknown on both sides.

I think the very process of arms control is useful.

Mr. NYE. May I add to that the following point?

I think Brent has put it correctly. When Jeremy talks about the role of arms control and how it can reduce the probabilities of nuclear war—when he says that the key thing is its effects on the politics on the United States/Soviet relationship, then I think I totally

agree with him on both the general climate; and also on what Brent called the "transparency."

And that is why we have recommendations like "operational arms control," regular talks between military leaders, and maintaining in the framework of SALT II such things as noninterference with national technical means.

But there is no disagreement with us about that dimension of arms control. That you might call the "political dimension of arms control."

Where the disagreement might occur is when you say, "should we stop the Midgetman system?"

Or "should we stop D-5?"

And one model says, "Well, that's piling up additional arms; therefore, it is bad for arms control, bad for probabilities of nuclear war."

Another model says, "No, it might be better to, in fact, increase those systems, not to freeze them, because the piling up of arms per se is not the problem; it is the nature of the relationship." Where we agree is about the politics of the arms control process; where we may disagree is on whether you would modernize and add some particular military systems.

The CHAIRMAN. Anybody else? Any other comments?

Mr. EMMERICHS. Do you see it as possible, and if possible, desirable to attempt to institutionalize in some way the approach that you are suggesting?

Mr. ALLISON. Well, one suggestion that we do have is that the criterion which says, "What is the impact of a particular initiative—a defense initiative or a diplomatic initiative—on the risks of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union?" And then one uses the framework, as Al suggested, of paths to nuclear war, and factors that affect the likelihood for the paths, and action that could reduce risks as a way of analyzing proposals that are put on the table.

We believe that would be a good system. When we went into the study, I assumed that you could look around the Defense Department and find, in effect, a net assessment of the impact on the risk of nuclear war of particular initiatives.

We have looked around quite hard. I don't think you can do that.

If a sustained analysis means, at least, a half hour thinking about the problem, we think this would be quite a good criterion that the committee—even the Armed Services Committee—might impose, as a test for proposals, that at least people should be able to give an account. They won't necessarily come to the same conclusion about Midgetman, but at least the argument should be put in terms of "for Midgetman": what do you believe if we were to go ahead with this would be the net impact on risk of nuclear war, looking down all five paths, and across the paths, not just in terms of the way the system is presented seriatim?

Mr. STONE. Can I make just a final comment, Les, and putting in perspective what arms control has done, because it fits in with what I have urged.

It seems to me that serious arms control started in some ways in 1963; and after 10 years the two sides agreed to stop the antiballistic missile systems.

And then we have had that treaty now for 10 years, and it is still with us, and I think there is every hope of keeping it together.

And now, we have just reaffirmed yesterday an offensive weapon treaty that amounts to a certain kind of freeze because it was over our limits on the offensive weapons.

And I think in the 40-year context of the arms race what is left now is to turn down the weapons levels, something which both sides now agree that in principle they want.

And so, in historic perspective, Mr. Chairman, you might see a halt to the defensive systems—you know, if you were writing the history of the arms race later you would see this halt starting in 1973 after a 10-year debate. Then you would see in 1979 and the 1980's an offensive weapons limitation holding together.

And then it seems to me the job to put the finishing touches on many aspects of the arms race, all you would need is a very simple agreement that would start to shrink those offensive weapon limits; and I think politically, as well as militarily, this would be a certain kind of coup de grace for the arms race because it would be very difficult to build a lot of new weapons while the world saw a certain amount of reduction going on each year.

I am one of the few people left in town who think that in historic perspective arms control is not doing so badly. It is only those people that expect it to happen in the first 3 years since they have been elected to Congress, you see, or who have—in the first 3 years since their foundations started giving money to it or something like that—that think that it is going bad.

I think if we got now a reduction agreement—and both sides are calling for it; everybody seems to be for it; we have got a structure in place that could be shrunk to do it. And we really would have achieved something very, very important. It would take a lot of the hot air out of the contest.

And that's the name of the game. Once the hot air is out of the contest, most of the danger will disappear, and these technical fixes, as important as they are, won't be that important.

General SCOWCROFT. Mr. Chairman, if I could just say—yes, I do not believe numbers is the name of the game. I think it is pursuing a "will-o-the-wisp" and is wasting our time.

I would remind Jeremy that it was this administration that changed the name "SALT" to "START" and to focus on reduction of numbers. They did propose a sharp reduction in their first START proposal, one which would have left both sides, I think, perhaps, more unstable than before. I think the focus ought to be, as the book correctly says, on the kinds of weapons and use, not numbers.

Mr. NYE. May I add a comment to this, in terms of answering Mr. Emmerich's question about process?

What is interesting is that even if Jeremy's proposal was taken, it would handle one piece of a puzzle, which is cutting numbers of weapons; it would not deal with most of the 10 things that I listed as having serious effects on nuclear war.

Let me take you back to what it says about the committee's task right here in front of us, "to make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval forces."

The problem is that there is no legislative handle on those questions. Yet, I remember from the period when I was in the executive branch that the one thing that could get into my "In box" quicker than anything else was a request from the Congress.

I would suggest that it might be an interesting innovation in process if this committee were to ask the administration once a year or once over some regular period of time to respond to the question of what they have done on these operational issues that affect the nuclear agenda, whether you want to call it the "owls' agenda," or whatever you want to call it. You might take a list of a dozen or so things that affect the operational questions which affect risk of nuclear war, ask for administration response.

You will be surprised at how quickly that will change "In boxes" within the executive branch, and I submit that that would touch an element or a dimension of the area of nuclear risk which is untouched by the type of proposal that Jeremy mentioned.

Mr. STONE. I agree with Professor Nye's suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, all, very much, for a very, very interesting and informative morning.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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